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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an interlocutory discovery order 
of the Third Judicial District Court of Tooele County, Utah, 
entered by the Honorable Frank G. Noel. This Court granted 
Gold Standard, Inc. ("Gold Standard") permission to appeal the 
District Court's Order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 5 on 
July 6, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Texaco and Getty disagree with Gold Standard's 
characterization of the issues presented in this appeal. The 
issues this Court should decide are legal issues, not factual 
issues. Gold Standard's statement of issues is so burdened 
by factual assertions which are contrary to the district 
court's findings and the facts set forth in the Record as to 
make the statement confusing and misleading. The overall 
question is simply stated: 
Did the district court abuse its discretion in ruling 
that two memoranda, which it determined were created by Getty 
in anticipation of litigation and as a direct result of 
specific threats by Gold Standard, are protected under the 
work product doctrine of Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)? 
This determination will require the Court to consider the 
following questions of law and mixed questions of law and 
fact: 
1. Can the work product doctrine of Rule 26(b) (3) apply 
to documents created in anticipation of litigation by a party 
or its representative without proof of direct attorney 
supervision? 
2. Is opinion work product discoverable simply by 
demonstrating "substantial need" and "under hardship?" 
3. Can a party meet the "substantial need" and "undue 
hardship" test of Rule 26(b)(3) by making conclusory and 
unsupported claims that it needs the work product documents 
and that it cannot obtain the information elsewhere? 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion in 
finding that Getty did not intentionally and knowingly 
relinquish its right to assert its work product protection? 
5. Does the district court have the authority to 
control informal discovery and prevent a party from invading 
its opponent's work product rights through ex parte contact 
with the opponent's former employees? 
CONTROLLING RULE 
Rule 26(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides: 
Trial preparation: Materials. Subject to the 
provisions of Subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a 
party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible 
things otherwise discoverable under Subdivision 
(b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of 
litigation or for trial by or for another party or 
by or for that other party/s representative 
(including his attorney, consultant, surety, 
indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing 
that the party seeking discovery has substantial 
need of the materials in the preparation of his case 
and that he is unable without undue hardship to 
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials 
by other means. In ordering discovery of such 
materials when the required showing has been made, 
the court shall protect against disclosure of the 
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal 
theories of an attorney or other representative of 
a party concerning the litigation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In early 1987, Gold Standard obtained copies of two 
memoranda from Richard Klatt, a former employee of Getty, who 
took copies of the documents with him when he left Getty's 
employ. R. at 2924-25. [The two documents are: Memorandum 
from Charles J. Kundert to John M. Mintz dated July 13, 1984; 
and Memorandum from John M. Mintz to H. Edward Wendt dated 
July 16, 1984 (hereafter referred to collectively as the 
"Memoranda") (copy included in Addendum as Item Number 1)]. 
On June 1, 1987, Gold Standard's counsel met ex parte with 
Charles Kundert, the author of the principal memorandum and 
obtained his affidavit concerning the Memoranda. 
When Getty learned of Gold Standard's ex parte contacts 
with Getty's former employees, Getty recognized the potential 
threat to its rights and privileges and sought an order from 
the district court, restricting such ex parte contacts. The 
Court denied Getty's motion, but ruled that the ex parte 
contacts must not jeopardize Getty's privileges. R. at 13 4 0 
(copy of Memorandum Decision re Ex Parte Contacts dated April 
6, 1988 included in Addendum as Item Number 2). 
After Getty learned that the Memoranda were created by 
its employees as a direct result of Gold Standard's threats 
and in anticipation of litigation, it filed a motion for 
protective order. The court granted Getty's Motion on 
November 18, 1988 (Minute Entry attached to Addendum as Item 
Number 3), and it issued a Memorandum Decision dated November 
23, 1988, summarizing its conclusions. (Copy of Memorandum 
Decision included as Addendum Item Number 4). 
In its Memorandum Decision, the Court ruled that "the 
documents in question are work product prepared in 
anticipation of litigation." R. at 3262. The court concluded 
that "Getty has not waived its right to assert the work 
product doctrine with regard to the[] documents." R. at 3 2 62. 
The court determined that Getty had taken "reasonable 
precautions to prevent inadvertent disclosure of protected 
documents," especially "where the documents in question were 
obtained from Getty's files by a former Getty employee, and 
thereby ultimately made available to opposing counsel." Id. 
The court considered Getty's timeliness in bringing its motion 
and ruled that "defendants have not acted in a dilatory manner 
either in coming to a knowledge of the importance of the 
documents in question or subsequently seeking their return." 
R. at 3261. 
The court recognized the inter-relation between its 
ability to manage discovery in the case and Getty's right to 
claim work product protection for the two documents: 
The Court has previously ruled in this case that 
plaintiffs' counsel may unilaterally make contacts 
with former Getty employees. In order for that 
position to be sound, the Court must be able to 
enforce the protections of the attorney-client 
privilege and the work product doctrine where 
documents falling within those protections are 
obtained by opposing counsel during those unilateral 
contacts. 
R. at 3261. 
Finally, the court considered and rejected Gold 
Standard's argument that the court had no ability to prevent 
Gold Standard from invading Getty's privileges and protections 
through informal discovery. It recognized that such a 
position would render the Court "helpless to enforce the work 
product doctrine as to any documents that were obtained by 
whatever means, outside of formal discovery." Id. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1973, Getty and Gold Standard entered into an 
Operating Agreement respecting mining claims near Mercur, 
Utah. Under the Agreement, Getty owned a 7 5% undivided 
interest and Gold Standard held the remaining 25%. Getty 
agreed to pay all of the expenses during the exploration phase 
of the agreement, except that the parties would share in the 
expense of a feasibility study to determine if they should 
proceed with development of a producing mine. Under the 
Operating Agreement, if the parties agreed to commence with 
the development of the property, they would enter Phase II of 
the project and each would be required to fund its share of 
the development expenses as they were incurred. If either 
party failed to pay its share of the expenses, its interest 
would be converted under the agreement to a net profits 
interest equal to 60% of the party's participating interest. 
In October, 1980, management responsibility for the 
Mercur project was transferred from Los Angeles to Salt Lake 
City. In the summer of 1981, nine months after the transfer 
of responsibility to Salt Lake, Getty gave Gold Standard the 
final Bechtel Engineering Study ("Final Bechtel Study") and 
several internal Getty memoranda. Getty informed Gold 
Standard that these documents "form the Feasibility Study 
defined in the Operating Agreement." R. at 2617 (Letter from 
Getty to Gold Standard included in Addendum as Item Number 9) . 
After reviewing the materials, Gold Standard paid for its 
share of the cost of the Final Bechtel Study, which it was 
only obligated to do if the Bechtel Report constituted the 
feasibility study under the Operating Agreement. 
The parties then mutually agreed to proceed with 
development of a mine and to begin sharing the costs incurred 
in development of the project. After agreeing with Gold 
Standard, Getty contracted with Davy McKee (a large, 
international construction firm) to construct the mining 
complex at a cost in excess of $80 million. Gold Standard was 
required to pay 25% of the costs of the project as incurred 
in order to remain a participating interest holder. Gold 
Standard was unable, however, to fund its share of the project 
and, pursuant to the Operating Agreement, was converted to a 
net profits interest holder early in 1982. Getty continued 
to develop the project on its own, at a cost in excess of $80 
million, and began production in 1983. Thereafter, Getty and 
its successors began to make annual net profits payments to 
Gold Standard as required under the Operating Agreement. 
Gold Standard's Threatening Letter to Getty 
After production commenced at Mercur, Texaco acquired 
Getty. Shortly thereafter, Gold Standard wrote to Texaco, 
informing it of Gold Standard's allegations and asserting: 
[W]e feel that Getty's treatment of Gold Standard 
during the last few years has been manifestly 
improper and unfair under the circumstances, and 
completely contrary to our understanding of the 
intent of the 1973 Operating Agreement . . . . 
Gold Standard is still of the view that, as a 
legal matter, the "feasibility study" which is 
contemplated by the above-quoted portions of our 
Agreement with Getty means . . . one which would be 
acceptable by the SEC and by the various investment 
and commercial bankers . . . • As we see it, Getty 
Mining Company has failed to provide Gold Standard 
with such a "feasibility study" as specified by the 
Operating Agreement, and, legally speaking the 
parties as [sic] still in "Phase I" under that 
Agreement. 
R. at 2604-03 (copy included in Addendum as Item Number 10). 
In addition to its letter, Gold Standard enclosed a copy 
of two other letters. One of the letters was a ten-page 
letter to Gold Standard from its legal counsel describing 
"where [Gold Standard] stand[s] with Getty at this time from 
a general legal point of view." R. at 2615 (Letter from 
Robert S. McConnell to Scott L. Smith included in Addendum as 
Item Number 11) . The letter to Gold Standard from its counsel 
stated, in part: 
Getty therefore, appears to have knowingly pursued 
a course of action which has been a continuing 
obstacle to your being able to fund a 2 5% 
participating interest in the project. Their 
conduct has been manifestly unfair under the 
circumstances and completely contrary to my 
understanding of the intent of the parties in 
entering into the Operating Agreement . . . . 
Their action may also amount to an interference 
with your business relationships and a repudiation 
of the basic Operating Agreement. 
* * * 
I am very much of the view that an excellent case 
could be made that under the circumstances the 
Bechtel Report, together with the internal Getty 
memoranda and the related correspondence to date, 
does not amount to a "feasibility study" as 
contemplated by the Operating Agreement and that, 
legally speaking, the parties are still in "Phase 
I" under the Agreement. 
* * * 
[B]ased upon my review it is my feeling that you 
have good cause to complain about the treatment you 
have received from Getty and in my view you have the 
basis of a possible legal action against Getty for 
the damages Gold Standard has obviously suffered and 
will continue to suffer as a result of the basic 
unfairness towards Gold Standard which I have 
described above. 
R. at 2613, 2611, 2607-06 (emphasis added) (Item Number 11). 
Upon receiving Scott Smith's letter, the recipient Willis 
B. Reals, a senior Texaco vice-president, wrote to H.E. Wendt, 
President of Getty Mining Company in Los Angeles, concerning 
the matter. In his letter, Reals explained: 
The attached letter from Gold Standard Inc. dated 
June 28, 1984 discusses the claims that Gold 
Standard is making on Getty Mining Company in 
connection with the Mercur gold mine. 
Although you and I have discussed various facets 
of this problem from time to time, I would 
appreciate your detailed reaction to this letter, 
including legal advice. By copy of this letter to 
Mr. W. C. Weitzel, Jr. [Texaco's General Counsel], 
I would appreciate coordination between the Texaco 
and Getty legal staffs on this subject. 
R. at 2599 (emphasis added) (copy included in Addendum as Item 
Number 12). 
Accordingly, Jeffrey C. Collins, a Getty attorney in Salt 
Lake City, and John M. Mintz, a Getty executive in Los 
Angeles, among others, were asked to assist in assessing 
Getty's position and in responding to Smith's letter. In 
undertaking these assignments, both understood that there was 
a strong likelihood of litigation between Getty and Gold 
Standard on issues respecting the Mercur Mine, including the 
question of whether Getty provided Gold Standard with a proper 
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feasibility study.1 R. at 2715-14, 2701 (Affidavit of John M. 
Mintz at f 4, (included as Addendum Item Number 5) ; Affidavit 
of Jeffrey C. Collins at %% 5-6, (included as Addendum Item 
Number 6)). Their work was conducted in accordance with this 
understanding. Id. 
In response to Gold Standard's claim that it never 
received a feasibility study, Mintz instructed Charles J. 
Kundert, a minerals engineering manager for Getty, to review 
the Los Angeles files and determine, based on those documents, 
whether or not a feasibility study had been prepared and given 
to Gold Standard during the time that the Mercur Mine was 
under Mintz's management in Los Angeles. (This would 
encompass the period prior to October 1, 1980). In responding 
to Mintz's request, Kundert reviewed the Los Angeles files and 
prepared a memorandum to Mintz dated July 13, 1984 which 
provided a summary of his understanding of the document 
chronology and a conclusion, based upon his own personal 
opinion and interpretation of the documents he reviewed. 
Mintz then prepared a memorandum both summarizing and 
enclosing Kundert's memorandum, and sent it to Wendt on July 
16, 1984. R. at 2714 (Mintz Aff. at H 6-7). On the basis 
of more complete information provided by those with direct 
Also in response to Reals' request, Texaco attorney Amy 
Etherington wrote to Jeff Collins requesting his "legal analysis 
of Gold Standard's views as represented in [Scott Smith's June 28, 
1984 letter]" and "legal advice of how Texaco should respond to the 
above-mentioned letter." Record at 2589 (Exhibit 632). 
2 
It appears that Kundert was simply unaware of the facts 
and communications referred to above which led up to the request 
to Mintz, and understood only that he was responding to a 
management inquiry from Mintz. R. at 2644, 2647. 
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding delivery of the 
feasibility study, Wendt later responded on behalf of Texaco 
to Smith's letter. R. at 2600-01 (Letter from H.E. Wendt to 
Scott L. Smith dated October 25, 1984) (included in Addendum 
as Item Number 13). 
Significantly, Kundert did not review the documents given 
to Gold Standard in July 1981 which Getty maintains 
constituted the feasibility study (none of these documents 
even existed during the time period covered by Kundert's 
3 
review). R. at 2642 (Kundert Depo. at 57). Based only on 
the documents he reviewed, Kundert came to a qualified 
conclusion that a feasibility study had not been completed 
prior to the spring of 1981. At the same time, he emphasized 
that "[w]e have no knowledge of what documents were submitted 
to Gold Standard to satisfy the requirement of the Agreement." 
R. at 2637. 
After Gold Standard filed this lawsuit, it obtained 
copies of the Kundert and Mintz memoranda through ex parte 
contact with another former Getty employee, Richard Klatt. 
Klatt saw the documents while employed at Getty and took 
Kundert acknowledged this fact in his memorandum: "We have 
no knowledge of what documents were submitted to Gold Standard to 
satisfy the requirement of the Agreement." Mintz explained in his 
memorandum to Wendt that Kundert was ask to review Los Angeles 
files covering the time when the project was under Los Angeles 
management and that the review did not include the feasibility 
study given to Gold Standard in July 1981: "The Los Angeles staff 
was not involved in the project to any major extent after the 
project was transferred to Salt Lake City. We did not receive a 
copy of the Bechtel report . . . . " R. at 3188 (Item Number 1). 
copies of them with him when he left Getty. Klatt is now a 
paid consultant for Gold Standard. R. at 2633-32 (Deposition 
of Scott L. Smith at 2065-67). After Gold Standard obtained 
copies of these memoranda, their attorney contacted Kundert 
and conducted an ex parte interview with him regarding his 
memorandum. Following the interview, Gold Standard's attorney 
prepared an affidavit and asked Kundert to sign it. R. at 
2 649-48 (Kundert Depo. at 41-42). In his affidavit, Kundert 
stated that some potential purchasers of the mine asked about 
a feasibility study for Mercur and that he reviewed "files 
concerning Mercur that had been maintained at Getty Mining 
Company's Los Angeles office." It later became evident that 
Kundert merely speculated, incorrectly, that because the 
request from Mintz to review the files came after the 
questions were raised by visitors, Mintz must have been 
responding to those questions. 
After Texaco acquired Getty, it divested itself of 
Getty's mining properties, including the Mercur Mine in May, 
1985. As a result, most Getty employees who were associated 
with the Mercur project no longer worked for Getty at the time 
Gold Standard filed its lawsuit in December, 1986. This left 
The issue of the propriety of Klatt taking these documents 
from Getty was not fully developed in the district court. Klatt 
admits that he made copies of the documents for his personal file 
and took them when he left Getty. R. at 2926. Facts recently 
discovered by Getty suggest that Klatt violated an agreement he 
signed with Getty when he took the Memoranda. If the court 
determines that the propriety of Klatt removing the documents from 
Getty is relevant to the outcome of this matter, it should remand 
the matter to the district court so that the additional evidence 
on this subject can be considered. See Affidavit of Louis C. Rove, 
Jr. included in Addendum as Item Number 8. 
Getty without any access to knowledge of the chain of 
communications that included the preparation and transmittal 
of the Memoranda. Specifically, Getty was unaware that the 
Memoranda were prepared in direct response to Gold Standards 
legal threats. 
In September, 1987, prior to its first production of 
documents to Gold Standard, Getty received a copy of Kundert's 
Affidavit. R. at 2724 (Affidavit of Robert S. Clark, included 
as Addendum Item Number 7) . Prior to receiving a copy of this 
Affidavit, Getty was unaware that Kundert, a former Los 
Angeles employee of Getty, had had any involvement with the 
Mercur project after 1980. The explanation of the purpose for 
the July 13, 1984 memorandum given by Kundert in his Affidavit 
gave no indication that the memorandum was requested by 
management in anticipation of litigation, nor is this fact 
apparent from the memorandum itself. Since Texaco and Getty 
no longer had any employees with knowledge of the Gold 
Standard situation, Getty was otherwise unfamiliar with the 
circumstances surrounding the creation of the July 13, 1984 
memorandum and had no reason to question the explanation 
contained in Kundert's Affidavit. R. at 2723. Furthermore, 
Gold Standard already had a copy of the memorandum prepared 
by Kundert. 
Based on Kundert's Affidavit and Gold Standard's prior 
acquisition of the memoranda from Klatt, Getty did not 
recognize that the documents were created in anticipation of 
litigation as a direct consequence of threats from Gold 
Standard. Only later did it become evident that Kundert was 
simply in error when he guessed the reason Mintz asked for the 
review of the Los Angeles documents. R. at 2715 (Mintz Aff. 
at 1 4). 
Accordingly, in an extensive production of documents 
beginning in December, 1987, and continuing into 1988, Getty 
produced the two memoranda along with more than 49,000 pages 
of documents. Following this production, Getty first became 
aware of the possible work product nature of the Memoranda in 
June 1988. R. at 2722 (Clark Aff. at J 8) Getty immediately 
informed Gold Standard of its concerns and promptly filed its 
motion for protective order as soon as it was able verify its 
5 
concerns by meeting with a number of former employees. Getty 
filed its motion for a protective order as soon as its factual 
inquiry confirmed the work-product nature of the Memoranda. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court correctly ruled that the Kundert and 
Mintz Memoranda were created in anticipation of litigation 
with Gold Standard. Under Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), a 
document must satisfy three tests to qualify as work product: 
1) it must be a "document or tangible thing;" 2) it must be 
"prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial;" and 3) 
it must be prepared "by or for another party or by or for that 
other party's representative." The Memoranda clearly satisfy 
the first and third tests. The sole question which the 
Several former employees which Getty contacted to verify 
its concerns, including John Mintz, the executive who asked Kundert 
to prepare the memorandum, were out of the country for extended 
periods of time when Getty initially attempted to contact them in 
the summer of 1988. R. at 2722 (Clark Aff. at % 9). 
district court had to resolve was whether or not they were 
created "in anticipation of litigation." The district court 
correctly ruled that they were. 
The Rule does not require the direct involvement of an 
attorney. The doctrine is not designed to protect attorneys, 
it is designed to protect the adversary system. Although 
attorneys typically take the laboring oar in preparing a case 
for trial, the party and its employees frequently also play 
substantial roles. When a nonattorney employee creates 
documents "in anticipation for litigation," those documents 
deserve the same level of protection as documents generated 
by attorneys covering the same subject matter. 
The facts contained in work product documents can be 
discovered only by proving "substantial need" and "undue 
hardship." This exception to work product protection does not 
apply to "mental impressions, opinions, or conclusions" 
contained in work product documents. A substantial portion 
of both of the memoranda involved in this case consist of 
opinions, conclusions, and mental impressions are not 
discoverable under this exception. 
Gold Standard made absolutely no showing of substantial 
need or undue hardship to the district court. The burden of 
satisfying the exception rests with Gold Standard. The new 
evidence and arguments it raises to this court do not satisfy 
the exception either. 
Getty did not waive its right to work product protection. 
A waiver must be knowing and intentional. As soon as Getty 
gained knowledge of its right to work product protection, it 
promptly asserted it. 
The court has broad power to govern the pre-trial of a 
case, including informal discovery. In this case, Gold 
Standard obtained work product documents through ex parte 
contact with Getty7s former employees. The court had 
authority to remedy the resulting compromise of Getty's work 
product rights and did not abuse its discretion in so ruling. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case was filed nearly three years ago. Since that 
time, the district court has been called upon repeatedly to 
manage and control the discovery of the case and understand 
the complex facts and procedural background. Because such 
discovery orders depend in large part on weighing and sifting 
facts and understanding the procedural history of the case, 
district courts are given broad discretion to rule on such 
matters. See, e.g., Bennion v. Utah State Bd. of Oil, Gas & 
Mining, 675 P.2d 1135, 1144 (Utah 1983); National Hockey 
League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642, 
96 S. Ct. 2778, 2780 (1976). 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TWO MEMORANDA WERE CREATED IN ANTICIPATION OP LITIGATION 
AND SHOULD BE PROTECTED WORK PRODUCT UNDER RULE 2 6(b)(3) 
Getty agrees with Gold Standard that it is important for 
this Court to fashion a standard for evaluating work product 
such that the purposes behind work product protection are 
furthered rather than frustrated. The mechanistic approach 
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recommended by Gold Standard, however, will only frustrate the 
purposes of the work product protection and render it 
partially or wholly unavailable to many who are entitled to 
its protection. Gold Standard's position requires abandonment 
of much of Rule 26(b)(3) itself. The Court in fashioning a 
rule should begin by focusing on the express provisions of 
2 6(b) (3) rather than ignoring them as Gold Standard advocates. 
A. The Work Product Doctrine is Designed to Protect the 
Integrity of the Adversary System, Not to Cloak Attorneys 
With an Exclusive Right to Privacy. 
Texaco and Getty agree with Gold Standard that the work 
product doctrine is designed to protect the integrity of the 
adversary system. It does not exist to produce a 
confidential relationship, but rather to promote the adversary 
system by safeguarding the fruits of a party's trial 
preparation from the discovery attempts of an opponent. Like 
other rules designed to protect the adversary system, the 
doctrine was designed to safeguard a client's interests, not 
merely benefit the attorneys who work within the system. 
The roots of the modern work product doctrine are 
typically traced to the United States Supreme Court's decision 
in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S. Ct. 385 (1947). In 
Hickman, the Supreme Court recognized that if documents 
created in anticipation of litigation are open to an opposing 
party on mere demand, much of what is usually put down in 
writing will remain unwritten. Inefficiency, unfairness and 
In contrast, the attorney-client privilege is designed to 
protect the relationship between the client and his attorney. This 
relationship naturally requires the involvement of an attorney 
before it becomes relevant. 
sharp practices would inevitably develop. The Court fashioned 
the work product protection to insure that parties to a case 
can prepare independently, without fear that the other party 
can automatically obtain the benefit of its preparatory work. 
When the work product doctrine was recognized in Hickman 
forty years ago, the legal system was considered the exclusive 
domain of attorneys. The Hickman court spoke of the attorney 
as sole protector of his client's interests. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the Supreme Court in Hickman spoke 
of protecting an attorney's preparation for litigation. 
Nonattorney employees were rarely involved in case preparation 
in more than a clerical function and there is no indication 
in Hickman that the court considered the possibility 
7 . . . 
nonattorney involvement. Significantly, the court has never 
held that attorney involvement is required. 
By 1970, however, courts had recognized that the party 
itself and its nonattorney agents and employees often play a 
critical role in the preparation of a case for trial. As a 
result, in 1970, Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure was amended to codify, clarify and extend the work 
Although Hickman continues to provide useful guidance in 
construing the modern work product doctrine, it must be used with 
caution in interpreting Rule 26(b)(3), especially in construing the 
extent to which the doctrine applies to the work product of 
nonattorneys. As one court has stated: "The Hickman decision was 
the seminal case in the development of what is now termed the work-
product doctrine. Rule 26(b)(3) preserves the essential portion 
of the doctrine as announced in Hickman and resolves conflicts in 
the post-Hickman cases. It also notably expands the doctrine by 
extending discovery protection to the work-product of a party or 
his agents and representatives, as well as that party's attorney." 
Carver v. Allstate Ins. Co., 94 F.R.D. 131, 132 (S.D.Ga. 1982) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
product protection established by Hickman and its progeny to 
include the party itself and its agents. Significantly, the 
1970 amendment discarded the term "attorney work product" and 
substituted in its place "documents and tangible things" 
"prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or 
for another party or by or for that other party's 
representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, 
indemnitor, insurer, or agent)." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). 
Following the 1970 amendment, Utah adopted the amended Federal 
Rule 26(b)(3), incorporating the identical work product 
language.8 
Getty agrees that Hickman remains an important statement 
of the purposes of the work product doctrine, with one 
important caveat created by the 1970 amendment to the Rule: 
the protection applies equally to the party himself or his 
nonattorney agent if his or her efforts are "in anticipation 
of litigation." Gold Standard uses Hickman, not so much for 
a statement of the purposes served by the doctrine, but to 
point out that only attorneys are mentioned in Hickman. Yet 
that is precisely the aspect of Hickman which has been 
expressly altered since that case was decided. Whether or not 
the doctrine applied only to attorneys in 1947, such is not 
the case today nor should it be. The policies underlying the 
work product doctrine are equally served, regardless of 
whether the party, his attorney or his nonattorney agent 
Utah did not merely incorporate all of Rule 2 6 wholesale 
into the Utah Rules. Prior to 1986, Utah's provisions in Rule 26 
concerning experts differed considerably from the federal rule. 
prepared the document, as long as it was "created in 
anticipation of litigation or for trial," Rule 26(b)(3). 
This standard serves the adversary system by preventing the 
opposing party from unfairly using an adversaries' 
preparation. 
Admittedly, some courts continue to refer to the rule as 
the "attorney work product" rule. It is not surprising that 
courts and attorneys alike sometimes make such references 
since the rule prior to 1970 used that phraseology. Also, 
even though the characterization as "attorney" work product 
was deleted from the rule, the doctrine naturally is applied 
most frequently to the work of attorneys. As attorneys, it 
may be easy, however, to forget the critical role many parties 
and their nonattorney agents play in anticipating litigation 
and preparing for trial. In light of the history and 
development of the doctrine, no particular significance should 
be taken from continued references to the doctrine as the 
"attorney" work product rule. The rule is one relating to 
fairness in the adversarial process, not one which bestows 
attorneys with an advantaged status. 
B. Work Product Protection is Available to all Litigants 
Regardless of Whether Thev Employ an Attorney. 
Gold Standard argues that direct attorney involvement is 
necessary in the creation of a document before it can qualify 
Gold Standard highlights the decisions of some courts which 
still require direct attorney involvement, in disregard of the 
plain intent of the 1970 amendment, eliminating such a requirement. 
Gold Standard failed to note, however, that a number of courts and 
commentators have criticized and rejected such an approach as 
contrary to the clear intent of the amendment to the Rule. See, 
e.g. cases cited infra at Section II.A., p. 35. 
as work product under Rule 26(b)(3). Such a rule certainly 
offers a simple way to mechanistically eliminate protection 
of the work product of many nonattorneys, but the approach is 
simply wrong. 
The Rules of Civil Procedure are an integral part of the 
adversary system and all litigants are bound to abide by those 
rules. Some parties employ attorneys and engage them to 
pursue a matter destined for litigation long before a case is 
actually filed. Others may not consult an attorney until the 
litigation actually commences. Still others may never retain 
an attorney and will proceed through the court system as pro 
se parties. Each is equally bound by, and entitled to, the 
protections of the rules, regardless of when or whether an 
attorney is retained. 
This concept is especially critical in the application 
of Rule 26. Every party to a lawsuit, whether represented by 
counsel or not, has an equal interest in maintaining the 
privacy of its preparation and thought processes reflected in 
"documents and tangible things" which are "created in 
anticipation of litigation or for trial." It is the purpose 
of the preparation, not the credentials of the preparer that 
is important. 
Gold Standard suggests, however, that despite the plain 
language of Rule 26, a party is only entitled to work product 
protection once an attorney begins to oversee and manage the 
litigation efforts on behalf of the party. Presumably, this 
would mean that a party who does not have an attorney prior 
to commencement of a case would have to disclose all notes or 
documents created in anticipation of the litigation, yet the 
same party would be entitled to protection if he had employed 
an attorney to accomplish the identical purposes. Worse 
still, under Gold Standard's position, a pro se party would 
never be entitled to work product protection, even as to 
litigation plans or notes of mental impressions prepared on 
the eve of trial. Yet in fact, those who prepare for 
litigation and trial without the assistance of an attorney 
are, in many respects, more dependant upon the court and the 
procedural rules to protect them from their adversary. 
This is not merely an issue of whether the resources are 
available to employ an attorney; it is equally an issue of 
company management style. Some companies, such as Texaco and 
Getty, prefer to use its management to oversee many litigation 
related efforts, especially in the early stages of a dispute. 
Such was the case here. Not only was Ed Wendt, a nonattorney, 
asked to coordinate the legal review of the Mercur situation, 
he was asked to personally be responsible for the 
investigation related to Gold Standard's threats. In another 
company, this responsibility may well have been delegated 
directly to someone in the legal department. 
The decision regarding whether an attorney or a direct 
line executive oversees a litigation related project is simply 
and solely a question of management style. The work product 
rule was not intended to be blindly rigid so as to prevent the 
company who utilizes management for such responsibilities from 
claiming work product protection for those documents which are 
created in anticipation of litigation (and which would have 
been protected had a member of the legal staff been assigned 
responsibility). 
Courts and commentators alike agree that parties and 
their nonattorney agents are properly covered by the Rule. 
The Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rule expressly 
affirm the intent of the Rule's plain language: 
Subdivision (b)(3) reflects the trend of cases 
by requiring a special showing, not merely as 
to materials prepared by an attorney, but also 
as to materials prepared in anticipation of 
litigation or preparation of trial by or for 
a party or any representative acting on his 
behalf. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, Advisory Committee Notes, 48 F.R.D. 487, 
502 (1970) (emphasis added). Professor Moore emphasizes: 
[T]here is no distinction between materials 
prepared by the attorney in the case and those 
that are prepared by a claim agent, insurer, 
or other agent of the party or by the party 
himself. Therefore, the involvement of an 
attorney is not a prerequisite to the 
application of Rule 26(b)(3). 
4 Moore's Federal Practice, § 26.64[2] at 26-358 to 26-360 
(1987) (footnotes omitted). See also 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2024 at 207 (1970). 
A number of courts considering this issue have similarly 
concluded that a party or its representative can create 
protectable work product without the involvement of an 
attorney. In Moore v. Tri-City Hospital Authority, 118 F.R.D. 
This court has recently noted that where "the Utah rule [of 
Civil Procedure] is identical in all material respects to [the] 
federal rule," "[t]here is no reason to believe that the drafters 
of the Utah rule had any intention to depart from the substantive 
judgments made by the federal rule's drafters." Madsen v. 
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 249 n.4 (Utah 1988) (construing Utah R. 
Civ. P. 41) . 
646 (N.D. Ga. 1988), the defendant sought to compel production 
of diary entries which were recorded by the plaintiff over a 
two month period prior to the time he first consulted with 
legal counsel. The lawsuit involved the plaintiff's 
termination as a hospital Chaplain and he testified in an 
affidavit that he began formulating plans for a law suit and 
recorded notes in his diary several months before consulting 
an attorney. The court properly focused on the question of 
whether the plaintiff prepared the entries "in anticipation 
of litigation:" 
Plaintiff has demonstrated that these entries 
were made in contemplation of the litigation 
in this particular case. [citation omitted] 
The mere fact that plaintiff's assertion of 
work-product includes the month and a half 
period before plaintiff retained counsel is not 
determinative. 
Id. at 650. 
In Duplan Corp. v. Peering Milliken, Inc., 540 F.2d 1215 
(4th Cir. 1975) , the appellant made the same argument that 
Gold Standard makes here: 
The thrust of the [appellants7] argument as to 
these documents [created by a non-attorney] is 
that they were not generated by trial counsel, 
were not generated for or at his request, and 
were not a part of or related to any legitimate 
trial preparation. 
Id. at 1219. The Court rejected the appellant's position, 
concluding that 26(b) (3) clearly can apply to the work of non-
lawyers created in anticipation of litigation. Id. See also 
Eoppolo v. National RR Passenger Corp., 108 F.R.D. 292, 294-
95 (E.D. Pa. 1985) ("It is not necessary for an attorney to 
be involved in the proceeding to bar discovery"). 
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The Colorado Supreme Court, interpreting Colorado's 
identical work product rule, has similarly held: 
C.R.C.P. 26(b)(3), like Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3), 
draws no distinction between trial preparation 
materials compiled by an attorney and those 
prepared by some other agent of a party. 
Hawkins v. District Court. 638 P.2d 1372, 1377 (Colo. 1982) 
(footnote omitted). The court in Hawkins explained the only 
relevance of an attorney's involvement: 
The significance of documents, reports and 
statements being prepared by or under the 
direction of an attorney, rather than a 
nonattorney agent of a party, is that the 
attorney's participation is some indication 
that the materials were prepared in 
anticipation of litigation or for trial. 
Hawkins, 638 P.2d at 1377 n.4. An attorney's participation 
or oversight is not controlling; it is merely one factor among 
many which a court must weigh in determining whether a 
document was created in anticipation of litigation and, 
therefore, eligible for work product protection. 
C. The Two Memoranda Were Created in Anticipation of 
Litigation and Are Protected Work Product Under Rule 
26(b)(3). 
Regardless of whether a document is created under the 
supervision of the party or its attorney, the relevant 
question is the same: Was the document "created in 
anticipation of litigation or for trial?" This standard 
protects the doctrine from wholesale and unrestrained 
application to ordinary business documents while at the same 
time effectuating the purposes for which it was created. The 
factual circumstances supporting the Court's ruling that the 
Memoranda are work product are compelling. On June 28, 1984 
Getty received several letters from Gold Standard in which 
Gold Standard asserted that Getty had failed to provide a 
feasibility study, that Getty's conduct formed "the basis of 
a possible legal action" and that Getty "might have a legal 
disclosure responsibility" as a result. Addendum Item 10. 
Within a few days of receiving these allegations, Reals, the 
recipient of Gold Standard's threatening letter, requested 
that Ed Wendt, President of Getty Mining, oversee a review of 
the allegations and coordinate legal review. Among other 
things, Wendt contacted John Mintz, told him that Gold 
Standard was threatening legal action and asked Mintz to 
assist. Mintz instructed Charles Kundert to undertake a 
• . . . i' 
review of Los Angeles files on the feasibility study issue. 
John Mintz, the executive who requested the information from 
Kundert, testified that he understood that Gold Standard was 
threatening litigation and that the project was being 
performed in response to that threat. R. at 2715-14 (Mintz 
Aff. at f 4). The resulting review was promptly transmitted 
to Mr. Wendt. 
The facts make it clear that the review was undertaken 
as the result of Gold Standard's threats of legal action. 
This is not a situation where management made a decision to 
Ed Wendt's inability to recall in his deposition the 
precise details of his response to Reals' request does not alter 
the facts as they have been developed. John Mintz did recall the 
communications between Wendt and himself. Getty should not be 
penalized for the fading of memories of its former employees with 
the passing of several years time. Gold Standard controlled the 
timing of filing the lawsuit and must live with the fact that 
memories have faded and that the facts are now more difficult to 
piece together. 
investigate a routine internal matter out of an abundance of 
caution prior to actual threats from third parties. The 
memoranda were created in direct response to very detailed and 
clear threats from a potential adversary that later did in 
fact sue Getty and Texaco over those allegations. Virtually 
no court has taken a position that the work product doctrine 
applies only after a suit is actually filed. These are 
exactly the type of pre-lawsuit documents which the work 
product doctrine was intended to protect. 
D. The Kundert and Mintz Memoranda Were Prepared in Response 
to Direct Threats From an Opposing Party. Not in the 
Ordinary Course of Getty's Business, Making Thomas Organ 
and Its Progeny Inapplicable to this Case. 
Some courts have struggled over drawing a line between 
activities performed in the ordinary course of a company's 
business and those performed in anticipation of litigation. 
Difficult line-drawing is not necessary here, however: Getty 
clearly created the Memoranda in anticipation of litigation. 
Gold Standard relies heavily upon a line of cases which 
originated with Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna 
Plovidba, 54 F.R.D. 367, (N.D. 111. 1972) , an insurance claim 
investigation case, to argue that "a document cannot possibly 
qualify for work product protection if no lawyer has any 
involvement in its preparation." Appellant's Brief at 23. 
The approach taken by Thomas Organ and its progeny has been 
criticized by commentators and courts alike, even in its 
application to insurance investigation cases. Professor Moore 
states: 
By ruling that "no document authored prior to the 
consultation of an attorney may be deemed to have 
been prepared in anticipation of litigation," the 
Thomas decision misinterprets the purpose of the 
1970 amendment. 
4 Moored Federal Practice. % 26.64[2], at 26-360 n.23. The 
court in Basinger v. Glacier Carriers, Inc., 107 F.R.D. 771 
(M.D. Pa. 1985) noted: 
The Thomas Organ view has been rejected by many 
courts as contrary to the intent of the 1970 
amendments to Rule 26(b). As one court noted, 
"Thomas's flat requirement of a lawyer7s involvement 
raises a bump which the 1970 Amendments had smoothed 
over. . . ." 
Id. at 773 (quoting Spauldina v. Denton. 68 F.R.D. 342, 345 
(D. Del. 1975)). 
Even if Thomas Organ is not rejected outright, its 
holding should be read narrowly. Insurance companies 
routinely investigate claims before paying them. Relying on 
the date when attorneys first become involved with a claim 
offers a simple, albeit crude and potentially misleading, 
method for a court to draw a line between an insurance 
company's ordinary business of claims investigation and 
preparation for potential litigation. Outside the context of 
insurance claims investigation, such a "bright line" test is 
simply unnecessary and prejudicial to those who do not chose 
to retain an attorney at the first threat of litigation. In 
a business such as mining, the type of investigation conducted 
by Kundert was certainly not ordinary nor reoccurring. 
While rejecting the plain reading of the Utah Rule, Gold 
Standard urges the Court to apply the holding of an Illinois 
case to construe the Utah Rule. The Illinois decision in 
Consolidation Coal Company v. Bucyrus-Erie Company, 432 N.E.2d 
250 (111. 1982), relied upon extensively by Gold Standard, is 
factually and legally so different from this case as to render 
it valueless in deciding this case under the Utah Rule. The 
Illinois rule is uniquely restrictive among work product 
rules: 
Material prepared by or for a party in 
preparation for trial is subject to discovery 
only if it does not contain or disclose the 
theories, mental impressions, or litigation 
plans of the party's attorney. 
Illinois Court Rule 201(b)(2) (emphasis added).13 In 
Consolidation Coal, supra, the Illinois Supreme Court simply 
applied the express language of its restrictive work product 
provision and concluded that a memorandum created by a 
nonattorney did not contain an attorneys' theories, mental 
impressions or litigation plans. Admittedly, the Memoranda 
here do not contain an attorney's mental impressions or 
litigation plans. But, unlike the Illinois rule, that is not 
required under the Utah Rule. 
Gold Standard argues that management investigations are 
not protected "even though prepared in anticipation of 
litigation." Appellant's Brief at 28. This is simply 
incorrect and not supported by cases interpreting Rule 
Gold Standard acknowledges in a footnote that the Illinois 
Rule "'differs significantly from the more broadly protective 
Federal rule,'" but inexplicably asserts that the differences in 
the language are "irrelevant here" and that the case should be used 
as "persuasive authority" in interpreting the meaning of the Utah 
Rule. In fact, the Illinois rule is so different from the Utah 
Rule as to render decisions under the former essentially useless 
in Utah. 
Not surprisingly, the Consolidation Coal case has never 
been cited for its work product holding in a reported opinion 
outside of Illinois, yet has been cited by numerous Illinois 
courts. 
26(b)(3). In the cases cited by Gold Standard, the courts did 
not conclude that the investigations involved were created "in 
anticipation of litigation." Indeed, several of the cases 
expressly ruled that they were not. 
The internal investigations in cases cited by Gold 
Standard were conducted by the company prior to receiving 
direct threats or allegation of misconduct or legal liability 
from an opponent. Whether the claim is based on tort or 
breach of contract, the "mere contingency" that litigation may 
result is not enough. Until the potential opponent takes 
affirmative steps, the litigation remains a "mere 
contingency." But when a potential adversary, like Gold 
Standard in this case, makes particularized and direct 
allegations of legal liability, an opposing party should be 
able to begin preparations to defend itself against the 
specific allegations asserted by its opponent, without fear 
of compelled disclosure of its preparation to the accusing 
party. Litigation is no longer speculative, it is a real 
possibility once such direct threats have been made. Gold 
Standard argues, without support, that it should be able to 
See Soeder v. General Dynamics Corp. , 90 F.R.D. 253 D. Nev. 
1980) (defendant conceded that the reports were "prepared routinely 
after every plane crash," no evidence of specific threats of 
litigation); Janicker v. George Washington Univ., 94 F.R.D. 648 
(D.D.C. 1982) (report prepared following fire; no mention of 
threats of litigation from potential plaintiffs); Coastal States 
Gas Corp. v. D.O.E., 617 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (no indication 
that there "was even the dimmest expectation of litigation" at time 
documents were drafted); Consolidation Coal, supra (investigation 
of wheel excavator collapse; no indication of specific threats by 
opponents); Hensel Phelps Const. Co. v. Southwestern Roofing & 
Sheetmetal Co. , 29 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1095 (D. Colo. 1980) (the 
stated purpose of report on defective roofing was to identify and 
repair problems; no evidence of threats of litigation). 
Paap ?Q 
discover documents which were created by Getty as a direct 
result of Gold Standard's own threats of legal action against 
Getty. Getty's investigation is the very type of material 
created early in a case which the work product doctrine was 
designed to protect. Once a party asserts legal claims 
against another, it should not be entitled to build its case 
on the work done by the other party in response to those 
threats. 
The "battleground" of the work product doctrine under the 
Utah and Federal Rule is whether the document was prepared "in 
anticipation of litigation," not whether there was attorney 
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involvement as Gold Standard claims. Many of the cases 
cited by Gold Standard focus on whether documents were 
"prepared in anticipation of litigation." In Simon v. G.D. 
Searle Co., 816 F.2d 397, 401 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 484 
U.S. 917 (1987) the court concluded that risk management 
documents containing aggregate reserve information from a 
large number of cases was not protected work product because 
it was created for "business planning purposes including 
budget, profit and insurance considerations." Id. As a 
result, the court concluded that the documents served 
"business planning functions" and "were not themselves 
prepared in anticipation of litigation." Id. at 401. 
1
 Attorney involvement is neither necessary nor sufficient. 
Even when a document was created solely by an attorney, a court 
still must determine whether it was created "in anticipation of 
litigation." 
16
 Even in Scott Paper Co. v. Ceilcote Co., Inc., 103 F.R.D. 
591 (D. Ma. 1984) , upon which Gold Standard places so much 
reliance, the court concludes that "[t]he primary motivating 
The outcome of the Simon case would be the same under the 
test applied by the district court in this case. Unlike the 
Getty Memoranda, the risk management documents in Simon, were 
not created as a result of specific threats from a potential 
adversary nor did they involve consideration of the factual 
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allegations raised by an adversary. The Memoranda in this 
case were prepared immediately on the heels of receiving 
allegations of legal liability from a potential adverse party. 
Gold Standard repeatedly asserts that the district 
court's order somehow conceals "the truth." Getty strongly 
disagrees with Gold Standard's characterization. The Kundert 
and Mintz Memoranda are nothing more than an opinion by 
Kundert as to whether certain documents contained in Getty's 
Los Angeles files (not Salt Lake's files) would constitute a 
bankable feasibility study. These are not even the documents 
(...continued) 
purpose behind the report was not to aid in possible litigation 
[citations omitted], but to foster a commercial disposition of the 
controversy that would obviate any need for litigation." Id. at 
597. As in Simon, the court did not discuss specific allegations 
of legal liability which were made against the a party prior to the 
time it prepared a document. 
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Gold Standard also asserts that a few cases have indicated 
that the author of a document must be aware of the intended purpose 
of the document. The only cases cited, however, establish no such 
requirement. In E.E.O.C. v. Commonwealth Edison. 119 F.R.D. 3 94 
(N.D. 111. 1988), the court concluded that no one within 
Commonwealth, including the author of the memoranda, anticipated 
litigation. In fact, the court specifically looked beyond the 
author of the memoranda to determine whether the company itself had 
adopted a "litigation mindset" at the time of the employee's 
investigation. Similarly, in Scott Paper, supra. there is no 
indication that the employee was assigned by someone else, attorney 
or executive, to prepare the memoranda. Certainly, if an employee 
creates a document without a request from others, that person's 
intent must be controlling. In this case, however, Kundert 
testified that he understood that he was performing the project 
under the direction of Mintz. Record at 2647 (Kundert Depo at 47) . 
given to Gold Standard which Getty contends constitute the 
feasibility study. The opinions expressed in the Memoranda 
not only do not go to the ultimate issue, they would be 
extremely misleading. 
II. 
GOLD STANDARD FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE DOCUMENTS SHOULD BE 
PRODUCED UNDER THE EXCEPTION SET FORTH IN RULE 2 6(b)(3) 
Gold Standard argues that, even if the Memoranda are work 
product, it is entitled to their contents under the exception 
set forth in Rule 26(b)(3). Gold Standard fails to qualify 
under that exception for at least three reasons. First, the 
Memoranda contain mental impressions, opinions and conclusions 
to which the exception does not apply. Second, Gold Standard 
fails to demonstrate either "substantial need" or "undue 
hardship" as required by the exception. Finally, Gold 
Standard made no showing to the district court to satisfy its 
burden of proving the elements of the exception. 
A. The Memoranda Contain Opinions, Conclusions and Mental 
Impressions Which are Not Discoverable, Even Upon a 
Showing of Substantial Need and Undue Hardship. 
Under Rule 26(b)(3), the substantial need and undue 
hardship exception applies only to factual information in a 
work product document and expressly excludes "mental 
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an 
attorney or other representative of a party." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 26(b)(3). In Uoiohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 
101 S. Ct. 677 (1981), the Supreme Court stated: 
As Rule 26 and Hickman make clear, such [opinion] 
work product cannot be disclosed simply on a showing 
of substantial need and inability to obtain the 
equivalent without undue hardship. 
Id., 449 U.S. at 401, 101 S. Ct. at 688. 
Although much of the two Memoranda consist of mental 
impressions, opinions and conclusions of high level Getty 
managers made in response to Gold Standard's threat of 
litigation, Gold Standard discusses the exception as if it 
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applies to the entire contents of the documents. The Rule, 
and cases interpreting it, clearly establish that the 
opinions, conclusions and mental impressions of Kundert and 
Mintz are simply not discoverable under the standard set forth 
by Gold Standard. 
It is precisely the fact that the Memoranda contain 
mental impressions, conclusions and opinions of "high level 
Getty managers," prepared in response to threats of 
litigation, that makes Gold Standard so anxious to have the 
Memoranda. And yet that is the reason why the rule provides 
almost complete protection for opinion work product — to 
prevent the opponent from discovering the mental processes and 
opinions of a party or its representative, recorded as a 
result of the opponent's own threats of legal action. 
Courts considering disclosure of opinion work product 
have held that it is rarely, if ever, discoverable. See, 
Gold Standard disregards the distinction between fact and 
opinion work product, but it recognizes that the documents contain 
opinions and mental impressions: "Mr. Kundert was simply 
'reporting his and others' perceptions of the opposing party's 
position . . . ." Appellant's Brief at 31. It characterizes the 
opinions as "bald admissions by upper Getty management," (id. at 
12) , and asserts that the Memoranda "contain the truth, at least 
e.g. , In re Murphy. 560 F.2d 326, 336 (8th Cir. 1977) 
("opinion work product enjoys a nearly absolute immunity and 
can be discovered only in very rare and extraordinary 
circumstances") ; Connolly Data Systems v. Vector Technologies, 
Inc. , 114 F.R.D. 89, 95 (S.D. Cal. 1987). "Indeed, it appears 
that such opinion work product enjoys an almost absolute 
immunity from discovery. Therefore, not even a showing of 
substantial need, lack of substantial equivalent, and undue 
hardship can force the disclosure of these materials." Laxalt 
v. McClatchv. 116 F.R.D. 438, 441 (D. Nev. 1987) (citation 
omitted). See also Carver v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 94 F.R.D. 
131, 133 (S.D.6a. 1982) ("The rule is clear that mental 
impressions 'shall' be protected, even if a showing of 
substantial need and hardship is made with respect to other 
portions of a litigation document"). 
Without exception, the cases cited by 6old Standard 
involved only the discovery of facts, not opinion. In Gold 
Standard's own quote from Hickman, the Court limited the 
exception to "relevant and non-privileged facts 
essential to the preparation of one's case." Appellant's 
Brief at 34 (quoting Hickman) . Similarly, the decision by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Mower v. McCarthy, 122 Utah 1, 245 P. 2d 
224 (Utah 1952), was limited to discovery of fact statements 
of witnesses to a train accident which the court held were not 
work product under a prior Utah Rule. The work product 
involved in Klaiber v. Orzel, 714 P.2d 813 (Ariz. 1986), 
consisted of factual statements from witnesses regarding the 
amount of alcohol consumed by a driver prior to a fatal car 
accident. None of these cases considered opinion work 
product and Gold Standard provides no support for requiring 
disclosure of opinion work product in this case. 
The near-absolute protection provided for opinion work 
product applies to the opinions of the party and its 
nonattorney representatives as well. See, e.g.. Duplan Corp. 
v. Peering Milliken. Inc., 540 F.2d 1215, 1219 (4th Cir. 1976) 
("Opinion work product immunity now applies egually to lawyers 
and non-lawyers alike.") (quoting Duplan v. Moulinage et 
Retorderie de Chavanoz. 509 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1974)) 
(emphasis added); Laxalt v. McClatchy, 116 F.R.D. 438, 442 (D. 
Nev. 1987) ("The work product rule ... was adopted to shield 
the mental impressions and legal theories of a party's counsel 
or other representative") (citing Eoppolo v. National R.R. 
Passenger Corp.. 108 F.R.D. 292 (E.D.Pa. 1985) (emphasis 
added); United States v. Chatham City Corp., 72 F.R.D. 640, 
643 n.3 (S.D.Ga. 1976) ("[T]he impressions, opinions and 
conclusions of the attorneys or representatives of a party are 
not disclosable ... [and] [t]his protection is absolute."); 
Rodriguez v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 87 Cal.App.3d 626, 151 
Cal.Rptr. 399, 410 (1978). 
Gold Standard urges the Court to adopt an interpretation 
of Rule 26(b)(3) which contradicts and completely ignores the 
See also Southern Railway Co. v. Lanham. 403 F.2d 119 (5th 
Cir. 1968) (disclosure of eyewitness statements taken shortly after 
a train accident); Augenti v. Cappellini, 84 F.R.D. 73 (M.D. Pa. 
1979) (plaintiff's contemporaneous recollections of events relating 
to attempts to "deprogram" him away from the Unification Church). 
language of Rule 26(b)(3). It has provided no basis for 
overcoming the protection accorded to opinion work product. 
B. Gold Standard Has Not Satisfied its Burden of Proving 
That it Has Substantial Need for the Documents or that 
it Cannot Obtain the Substantial Equivalent Through Other 
Means. 
Even for factual work product to qualify under the 
exception to Rule 26(b)(3), a party must show 1) that it has 
a "substantial need of the materials in the preparation of 
[its] case;" and 2) that it is "unable without undue hardship 
to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other 
means." Utah R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Laxalt v. McClatchv, 116 
F.R.D. 438, 441 (D. Nev. 1987).20 Gold Standard failed to 
make the required showing to the district court. 
1. Gold Standard has Failed to Establish a Substantial Need 
for the Memoranda, Despite Its Characterization of the 
Documents as "Unique Smoking Gun Evidence." 
Gold Standard repeatedly asserts that the memoranda are 
invaluable in the preparation of its case. It states that the 
memoranda are essential because "one thing plaintiff must 
prove in this case is that the Bechtel report was not the 
contractually agreed upon feasibility study, and that Getty 
knew it." Appellant's Brief at 36. Yet Gold Standard 
entirely fails to tell the court that the documents discussed 
by Kundert and Mintz in their memoranda are not the documents 
Four of the six cases upon which Gold Standard relies in 
attempting to squeeze the memoranda into this exception to the work 
product rule were decided prior to enactment of the 1970 amendment 
and Utah's subsequent adoption of the Rule. Such cases are 
potentially misleading and Wright and Miller wisely caution that 
"pre-1970 cases must be resorted to with discrimination and care." 
8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2023, at 
193 (1970). 
which Getty gave Gold Standard in July 1981 to constitute the 
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"contractually agreed upon feasibility study." Thus, the 
opinions of Kundert and Mintz concerning the initial Bechtel 
report do not even speak to the real issue of whether the 
Final Bechtel Study, with its attachments, provided to Gold 
Standard in June and July, 1981, satisfied the requirements 
of the Operating Agreement. A fortiori, the Memoranda do not 
speak to the allegation that Getty knew that it had not 
provided Gold Standard with a feasibility study. Gold 
Standard has made no showing that the documents are crucial 
to its case. If anything, the Memoranda are misleading and 
confusing because they concern different documents from those 
which Getty maintains constituted the feasibility study. 
Gold Standard argues that the documents are discoverable 
work product because they are "unique catalysts in the search 
for truth." Appellants Brief at 36 (quoting Auaenti v. 
Cappellini, 84 F.R.D. 73 (M.D.Pa. 1979)). In Auaenti, the 
court opined that statements of a plaintiff were "unique 
In fact, Mr. Kundert expressly stated in his memorandum 
that, "[wje have no knowledge of what documents were submitted to 
Gold Standard to satisfy the requirement of the Agreement." R. at 
2596 (Addendum Item Number 1). 
In his deposition, Kundert testified that he was not aware 
of what documents Getty gave to Gold Standard in 1981: 
Q. And are you aware of additional 
information that Getty provided to Mr. Smith at 
or about the time that the final Bechtel report 
was given to him? 
A No, because as of October [1], 1980, we 
[Los Angeles management] had been removed, and 
this was later. 
R. at 2642 (Kundert Depo. at 57) . 
catalysts in the search for truth" because they contained 
contemporaneously recorded recollections of factual events. 
Almost without exception, the only documents held to 
qualify as "unique catalysts," have been contemporaneously 
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recorded eyewitness accounts of an event. In contrast, the 
Memoranda in this case merely review documents created and 
statements made more than three years earlier. Gold Standard 
offers no support for classifying a memorandum which reviews 
documents years after they were created as a "unique 
catalyst." To the contrary, the information is easily 
replicated by reference to the original documents Kundert used 
in his review. 
Simply asserting that it has substantial need for the 
memoranda is insufficient to overcome the protection provided 
even ordinary work product material under Rule 26(b) (3) . Gold 
Standard has failed to establish any substantial need for the 
memoranda in proceeding with this case. 
2. Gold Standard Has Made No Shoving of Undue Hardship in 
Obtaining the Substantial Equivalent of the Two Memoranda 
by Other Means. 
Even if Gold Standard could demonstrate a substantial 
need for the Memoranda, it has never made a showing that it 
is unable to obtain the substantial equivalent of the 
protected material by other means without undue hardship. 
"Substantial equivalent" does not require an exact duplicate. 
Gold Standard argues that simply because the documents are 
See, e.g., Fontaine v. Sunflower Beef Carrier, Inc. , 
F.R.D. 89 (D. Mo. 1980); Teribery v. Norfolk & Western Railway, 
F.R.D. 46 (W.D. Pa. 1975); McDouaall v. Dunn, 468 F.2d 468 ( 
Cir. 1972). 
unique, they should be discoverable. Of course, such 
reasoning is circular since all documents are unique in some 
respects. Gold Standard must demonstrate that it cannot 
obtain the substantial equivalent of the information contained 
in the documents without undue hardship. Not only did it fail 
to make such a showing in the district court (see infra 
section II.C), its arguments made in this Court similarly 
fail to satisfy this requirement of the rule. 
Nearly all of the factual information contained in the 
Memoranda is taken directly from documents. Gold Standard has 
made no showing that the documents themselves are unavailable. 
For example, Gold Standard asserts that the following 
information contained in Kundert's Memorandum is unavailable 
through other means: 
[T]he Data Room Index of material sent by our 
Salt Lake Office for Mercur, shows NO FEASIBILITY 
STUDIES. 
Appellant's Brief, at 37 (quoting Kundert Memorandum). Getty 
has produced the Data Room Index quoted by Kundert. 
Certainly, the Index itself is superior to Kundert's hearsay 
reference to it. Similarly, all of the other factual 
information contained in the Memoranda can be obtained by 
reference to documents available to Gold Standard. Gold 
Standard has made no showing that this information is 
unavailable. 
Gold Standard similarly asserts the substantial 
equivalent of Kundert's account of a conversation he had with 
Hautala, as well as Kundert's hearsay report of a conversation 
between J.P. Davies and Hautala, is unavailable through other 
means. Gold Standard has made no showing that it attempted 
to obtain substantially equivalent information through any 
other means, including by questioning Hautala or Davies about 
the conversations. Again, Gold Standard has engaged in ex 
parte contact with both of these witness, neither of whom have 
any ongoing relationship with Texaco or Getty. Furthermore, 
the substantial equivalent of the information revealed in 
those conversations may be available in depositions or 
documents. Gold Standard has simply made no showing of 
unavailability and cannot now attempt to make a showing in the 
first instance. 
Finally, Gold Standard bases its claim of undue hardship 
on several additional arguments, none of which merits reversal 
of the district court's ruling. First, Gold Standard cites 
two cases supporting the general proposition that if a witness 
is hostile, a deposition may not always produce the 
substantial equivalent of the facts contained in work product 
documents. Gold Standard then boldly asserts, without support 
in the Record, that both Kundert and Mintz are "hostile 
witnesses." Appellant's Brief at 40. Yet, neither man has 
any financial stake in the outcome of the case and neither has 
any ongoing relationship with Texaco or Getty. Kundert 
himself testified that he has no current connection with Getty 
whatsoever. He further stated: 
I have no ax to grind one way or the other and I 
told everybody involved I'll be happy to do whatever 
I can and say what happened as far as I remember. 
R. at 2646 (Kundert Depo. at 48) . Additionally, as indicated 
above, Gold Standard already made ex parte contact with 
Kundert and drafted an affidavit which he signed• This hardly 
sounds like the hostile witness Gold Standard seeks to 
portray. Pure speculation that the witnesses will be hostile 
is not sufficient to show undue hardship, especially when the 
facts contradict such an assertion. In re Davco Corp. 
Securities Litigation, 99 F.R.D. 616, 621 (S.D.Ohio 1983); 4 
Moore's Federal Practice % 26.64 [3-1] (2d ed. 1981). 
Gold Standard also points to a supposed discrepancy 
between the opinions of Kundert and Mintz, as expressed in 
their memoranda, and later statements made by them in 
documents, some of which are not part of the Record on Appeal 
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and thus not properly before the court. Yet mere conjecture 
of a discrepancy is not enough. See J. Moore, Federal 
Practice § 26.64; Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 2025 at p. 226-27. See also Klaiber v. Orzel, 714 
P.2d 813, 818 (Ariz. 1986). Furthermore, the discrepancy to 
which Gold Standard points, results not from contradictory 
testimony, but from Gold Standard's attempts to apply the 
opinions contained in the Memoranda to different documents 
from those which Kundert reviewed. 
See Appellant's Brief, at 39 n.13, wherein Appellant 
informs the Court that it "has taken the liberty of attaching the 
few referenced pages" of the Mintz Deposition, which "is not 
technically a part of the record in this case." Xd. Later in its 
Brief Appellant again "takes the liberty of putting [documents] 
before this Court" which it admits were "not made part of the 
record before the trial court." Id. at 42 n.16. Appellees 
respectfully object to the repeated reliance on facts and documents 
not not properly before the Court. This emphasizes the weakness 
of its position before the district court. Even if relevant new 
facts have arisen, they are for the trial court to examine and 
weigh in the first instance. 
Gold Standard is unable to prove from the record that it 
has met the requirements necessary for discovering factual 
work product. It failed to convince the trial court that it 
had a substantial need of the materials or that it was unable 
to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials from 
other sources. Clearly, Gold Standard has made no showing 
that the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the 
memoranda constitute protected work product. 
C. Gold Standard Failed to Satisfy Its Burden of Proving 
that the Memoranda Fall Within the Exception to Work 
Product Protection, 
An examination of the Record demonstrates that Gold 
Standard made absolutely no showing of substantial need and 
undue hardship in the district court. Its entire argument to 
the court consisted of two sentences in its brief: 
Gold Standard has substantial need of the document 
to show the depth and extent of Getty's knowledge 
of the validity of Gold Standard's claims. Gold 
Standard will suffer undue hardship by failing to 
allow it to keep these documents as Wendt, Getty 
Mining's President, and Reals, Texaco's Vice 
President, have both testified that they cannot 
recall ever seeing the documents or ever being 
apprised of their conclusions. 
R. at 3192. 
Gold Standard offered no affidavits or other evidence to 
support its two-sentence conclusory statement. The burden is 
on the party seeking discovery of work product documents to 
show that the material fits within the exception. Hodges, 
Grant & Kaufmann v. United States, 768 F.2d 719, 721 (5th Cir. 
1985); Lott v. Seaboard Systems R.R., 109 F.R.D. 554 (S.D. Ga. 
1985). This court need only determine whether the trial court 
abused its discretion. Brock v. Frank V. Panzarino, Inc., 109 
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F.R.D. 157, 159 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) ("The trial court has wide 
discretion in determining the existence of substantial need 
and undue hardship"). 
III. 
GETTY HAS NOT WAIVED THE WORK PRODUCT PROTECTION 
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known 
right. Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, 432 (Utah 1983). To 
waive a right, there must be an existing right, a knowledge 
of its existence and an unequivocal intent to waive the right. 
Id. This determination is very fact particular and must be 
decided on a case-by-case basis. As a result, an appellate 
court generally accords considerable deference to the finder 
of fact's determination. Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 1230 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Briaham City v. Mantua Town, 754 P.2d 
1230, 123 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("Absent a showing that 
[plaintiff] unequivocally intended to waive its right under 
the provision, we will defer to the trial court ruling"). 
A determination of waiver in the privilege or work 
product context is based on the same standard as waiver in 
other contexts. See Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. 
Servotronics, Inc. , 522 N.Y.S. 2d 999, 1004 (Sup. Ct. App. 
Div. 1987) (as with waiver in other contexts, "[ijntent must 
be the primary component of any waiver test"); Mendenhall v. 
Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 955 (N.D. Ill 1982). 
The waiver question in this case varies substantially 
from the waiver questions treated by the cases cited by Gold 
Standard. In the waiver cases cited by Gold Standard there 
was no question raised regarding whether the producing party 
knew of its right to withhold particular documents, only that 
the documents were accidently disclosed despite knowledge of 
its rights. In this case, as a result of actions by Gold 
Standard, Getty did not know, nor could it reasonably 
determine at the time it produced the two documents, that the 
memoranda constituted work product. The cases cited by Gold 
Standard consider whether or not the producing party7s actions 
implied an intent to waive work product protection, not 
whether or not the party even knew of its right to assert the 
protection. 
In our case, the question of intent to waive need not 
even be considered since Getty was without knowledge of its 
right in the first place. Utah law provides that a party can 
only waive a known right. In a recent decision, the Utah 
Court Appeals rejected a waiver claim because of evidence that 
the party lacked the necessary knowledge: 
The evidence does not demonstrate the Partnership 
relinquished a known right. The Woods failed to 
establish a primary element of waiver. 
Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(emphasis in original). 
Since a party can only waive a known right, it follows 
that a party cannot waive a right if it was acting under a 
misapprehension of fact at the time. See Mid-Century Ins. Co. 
v. Brown, 654 P. 2d 716, 720 (1982) ("one cannot waive that 
which he does not know or where he has acted under a 
misapprehension of facts"); Harris Bros. Const. Co. v. Crider, 
497 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Ky. 1973) (same); International Ins. Co. 
v. Jataine, 495 S.W.2d 309, 316 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (same). 
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In order for Getty to waive its right to the work product 
protection, it had to know of that right at the time it waived 
it.24See Barnes, 750 P.2d at 1230. By the time Gold Standard 
filed this lawsuit, no employees remained at Getty who were 
familiar with the circumstances surrounding the creation of 
any Mercur documents in 1984. Gold Standard obtained the 
document from Klatt and its counsel then contacted Kundert ex 
parte and asked him to sign an affidavit which Gold Standard 
prepared. Kundert's statements in the affidavit made it 
appear that the memorandum was created for a routine business 
purpose rather than in anticipation of litigation. Getty had 
no reason to question the explanation contained in Kundert's 
Affidavit. Without a good faith basis to object to the 
production, Getty was in essence compelled to produce the 
document pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure or subject 
itself to sanctions. 
It was only later, in Mr. Kundert's deposition that it 
was discovered that he prepared the Memorandum at Mr. Mintz's 
direction and that he had no direct knowledge of the purpose 
for which the Memorandum was requested. Only later, after 
meeting with Mintz and Collins did Getty discover that the 
Memoranda were created in anticipation of litigation with Gold 
Standard. 
Gold Standard had the burden of establishing that Getty had 
knowledge of the facts at the time it allegedly waived its right 
to work product protection. On appeal, this knowledge must be 
demonstrated from information in the record. See Curtis Publishing 
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 144, 87 S. Ct. 1975, 1986 (1967) (for 
purposes of establishing a waiver, the court stated that it was 
inappropriate to "determine whether a 'right or privilege' is 
'known7 by relying on information outside the record"). 
Gold Standard makes much of the fact that Richard Klatt 
saw the document while at Getty, took it with him when he left 
Getty and later gave it to Gold Standard. These facts merely 
highlight the unfairness to Getty of the method used by Gold 
Standard to obtain the documents. The fact that Richard Klatt 
read the documents while he was at Getty is irrelevant. 
"Disclosure to a person with an interest common to that of the 
attorney or the client normally is not inconsistent with an 
intent to invoke the work product doctrine's protection and 
would not amount to such a waiver." In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 
1081 (4th Cir. 1981), cert, denied. 455 U.S. 1000 (1982). 
Work product protection is not waived when a document is 
disclosed to others unless it is likely that the person will 
give the document to the adversarial party. Klatt was a Getty 
employee at the time he saw the document and Getty had no 
reason to believe he would later become a paid consultant for 
its adversary. Gold Standard has cited no cases which hold 
that a party waives work product protection by allowing its 
own employee to read a protected document. 
IV. 
THE DISTRICT COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO CONTROL INFORMAL 
DISCOVERY AND CAN PREVENT A PARTY FROM INVADING 
ITS OPPONENT'S WORK PRODUCT RIGHTS THROUGH 
EX PARTE CONTACTS WITH THE OPPONENTfS FORMER EMPLOYEES 
This Court gives broad discretion to a district court to 
control discovery. Bennion v. Utah State Bd. of Oil, Gas & 
Mining, 675 P.2d 1135, 1144 (Utah 1983). Gold Standard 
argues, however, that the Court lacks authority to prevent 
disclosure of work product through informal discovery. This 
position would not only improperly circumscribe the ability 
of the trial court to control discovery, it would encourage 
and reward discovery abuse and sharp practices. Gold Standard 
maintains that Rules 26-37 apply only to "formal" discovery 
methods and *[b]y their very terms" "do not apply to 
investigative efforts of a party outside the formal discovery 
process." Appellant's Brief at 47. 
Neither Rule 26(b) or 26(c) limits its application to 
"formal" discovery. Such an interpretation of the scope of 
the rule would permit an end run around the work product 
protection of 26(b)(3) and could seriously jeopardize the 
intended protection. 
If the court is powerless to prevent a party from 
obtaining an opposing party's work product through informal 
discovery, then an opponent could seek disclosure of work 
product materials from former secretaries or other employees 
of the party or attorney or even from the former attorney 
himself. Such a rule would enable a disgruntled former 
attorney, employee or other agent of a party to seriously 
damage the party's trial preparation by disclosing, without 
restraint, his former employer's entire case preparation and 
trial strategy simply by "taking the documents home with him." 
Whether or not the party could bring a legal action against 
the former attorney or employee, it would have no recourse 
against the opposing party which obtained the confidential 
information. Such a narrow interpretation of the trial 
court's broad power to control discovery is simply absurd. 
The few courts which have considered their own ability 
to control informal discovery have agreed that they do have 
such authority. In Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. 
LeMay, 93 F.R.D. 379 (S.D. Ohio 1981), the defendants asserted 
that a protective order entered by the court did not apply to 
documents from third party witnesses obtained through what it 
characterized as "informal" discovery. The protective order 
provided a method for identifying documents as "restricted 
information." The Court rejected the defendants7 assertion 
that the court could not apply the protective order to 
informal discovery: 
The Protective Order, Plaintiffs contend, simply 
does not apply to documents obtained outside of the 
formal discovery process. . . . 
* * * 
Upon carefully reviewing the arguments of the 
parties, this Court holds that the designation of 
the blueprints in question as "restricted 
information" was proper. The language of the 
Protective Order, taken as a whole, seems to 
encompass both "formal" and "informal" discovery, 
to use the terms suggested by the Defendants. That 
is, the Order can apply to information obtained 
through discovery methods by counsel for one party 
when counsel for the other party is not present. 
This Court could find no case law authority for this 
proposition (and parties have cited none), but it 
is not foreclosed by the language of Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 26(a), describing a variety of "discovery 
methods." 
Id. at 383 (emphasis in original). 
Another court has specifically recognized its power to 
prevent or remedy the disclosure of work product to an 
opponent through informal discovery. In Amarin Plastics, Inc. 
v. Maryland Cup Corp.. 116 F.R.D. 36 (D. Mass. 1987), the 
court allowed attorneys to contact a former employee of the 
opposing party, but emphasized that it had power to impose 
sanctions if opposing counsel sought the disclosure of the 
opponent's work product: 
If [defendant] can demonstrate, either by a 
deposition transcript or other evidence, that 
[plaintiff's] counsel sought in any way to cause 
[defendant's former employee] to divulge 
confidential attorney-client communications or work 
product to plaintiff's counsel, that conduct might 
well constitute sufficiently abusive conduct to 
impose sanctions. 
Id. at 42 (emphasis added). 
Gold Standard asserts that obtaining work product 
documents from a former employee of the opposition falls into 
the category of the ''type of investigation" that "parties and 
their counsel are supposed to do." To the contrary, informal 
discovery can only further the purposes of the adversary 
system if it is conducted so as to avoid uncontrolled 
disclosure of work product. Parties should not be allowed to 
avoid satisfying the standard under Rule 26(b)(3) for 
disclosure of work product by convincing former employees, 
agents or attorneys of an opponent to disclose such 
information. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling 
that the Memoranda are protected under the work product 
doctrine. The documents were created by Getty's employees in 
anticipation of litigation arising from allegations of legal 
liability which Gold Standard made against Getty a few days 
before the Memoranda were requested. 
The Memoranda contain summaries of other documents 
located in Getty's Los Angeles office, as well as the mental 
impressions and opinions of two Getty employees. Protecting 
the documents does not conceal "the truth" as Gold Standard 
contends. The Memoranda do not even discuss the documents 
which Getty asserts constituted the feasibility study. Gold 
Standard's smug assertion that Getty is trying to conceal "the 
truth" is offensive and false. The facts are fully available 
to Gold Standard. Gold Standard does not need the summaries 
of documents when it has copies of the original documents 
themselves. Opinions and mental impressions do not represent 
"truth" but merely one persons interpretation of selected 
facts which are equally available to all parties. Gold 
Standard has access to the same facts as Kundert did. 
Gold Standard has demonstrated no reasoned basis for 
requiring disclosure of the documents under the exception to 
Rule 26(b)(3). It made no showing of substantial need and 
undue hardship. The district court did not abuse its 
discretion and its decision should be affirmed. 
Submitted this ( ^ x ~ day of October, 1989. 
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